

2 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE J-4 CARD

SUBJECT: List of Outstanding JMAK Problem Areas

1. Boat Operations. What is the infiltration-infiltration authority of RAVB? While we have all agreed for a number of months that authority to run infiltration-infiltration boat operations should be given RAVB and, in fact, there has been some such authority extended by cable and confirmed in dispatches, but each time a specific operation arises, the same old reservations come up in our minds here in Headquarters. As a specific example, UN 4040 of 4 October, Operation CARIBOU, states that the RAVB is running an infiltration operation, that there is "no KUBARK interest," and that RAVB "only provided them with food and fuel." This is an excellent example of double talk. In fact, it is virtually impossible at the present time for any of the known groups in the Miami area to run an operation of this nature into Cuba without utilizing some personnel who could point a finger at KUBARK and/or the U.S. Government with regard to one or more of the following: contact and/or debriefing by CIA, training, support in repair or maintenance of boats, knowledge of KUBARK installations, special visa consideration, Coast Guard and IAMI forbearance or non-observance of covert type activities and the like. In view of this, it is recommended upon the Division or the Branch to acknowledge with an "approved" or "disapproved" message in response to UN 4040.

2. It will be recalled that several weeks ago former Ambassador to London FGJAB proposed a sabotage operation of a peculiarly and flagrantly unsavory nature. We had some reservations about this, first of all, because of LDCB's holdings in the Dominican Republic and a lot of other places, and at the Branch level, we did not know if the Agency wanted to become a partner with LDCB. We did not believe that SCIAA would "buy" the proposal without some expression of U.S. Government approbation. Thirdly, we doubted whether all the mechanics of pulling the operation could be effected without some direct Government support. Finally, we felt the U.S. would be, in any event, accused before the UN of being spacer, or of having tolerated the operation, and we were not sure what the U.S. government "posture" would be in such an event. After various consultations at various levels in the Agency, FGJAB was told we would not finance the operation. He has now come back and stated that Aliceburg and Malone will finance the operation and has implied, at least, that the Canadians will permit him to buy the planes and other equipment. All they want now is the proceeds from KUBARK. We in the Branch do not see that the situation has changed very much, but would like to bring this matter to the attention of HQ for authority for review. In short, when is "plausible denial" more than "soif Jelusion" in this type of thing?

3. M.I.C. Goodwin and his lawyers. M.I.C. advised that the Cuban factions of the lawyers and judges refused to accept assistance from M.I.C. as we brought them, probably a wise. It will be recalled that per C.U.T. 47356 M.I.C. was informed on 10 September that responsibility for organization and plans for exile Cuban, priests and lawyers will be M.I.C.'s. This cable was cleared, according to Col. King, by M.S. Goodwin and A.H.A. of State, 20 October 1961 (2:15 b), Col. King, Conclusion: Do we now wish to support the Cuban lawyers in any way to just let them drift and possibly become a nucleus of opposition to M.I.C., and another exile faction of significance over whom we will (then) exert virtually no influence?

4. CONTE Aguero and Mr. Howard Hunt's memorandum of conversation with Mr. Marshall, C.U.T. 47356, mentioned above, stated that our turning the lawyers over to M.I.C. did not constitute a precedent and M.I.C.'s demand for responsibility as exclusive channel to Cuban exile groups, DIA, and Ford, specifically rejected. M.I.C. agreed (then) that strategy to lose these groups into the C.R.C. would likely in the long run prove counter productive, although hopefully we would endeavor to give political guidance to the leaders of these entities. Since then we have had an exchange of cables with Hunt in which it was indicated by Hunt that M.I.C. in fact went back to CONTE Aguero and insisted that CONTE's future activities be subject to the direction of the C.R.C. In reply to DIA/T that CONTE's long maintained position of non-alignement with any political group was an asset for his activities and his job would not depend on his joining the C.R.C. Now we have a memorandum of 6 October from Mr. Hunt which in effect says we must reach an understanding with CONTE whereby independent support cannot be used to impede CONTE's joining the C.R.C. This of course does not mean that CONTE's broadcasts need be terminated, simply that they be financed and conducted through the existing C.R.C. mechanism. Obviously this is in direct contradiction to our previous understanding with A.H.A. and the White House. Aside from the need for Hunt to keep in closer touch with the Director, what is the answer?

5. CRC and internal Cuban groups. We have now been informed that as a result of our urging, the principal internal political groups have agreed to send representatives to the C.R.C. However, before final agreement:

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If this is given to WIRG, probably in the next day or two, they would then be in a position to know whether we sincerely want to do this and, if so, by whom. They say, and WIRG admitted to FUSA/PA, representatives on 15 September, that they had told them so, that the CGC was of no importance on the inside. They also say they see no real use in having the CGC unless it helps the U. S. Government in some way.

a. It will be recalled that Col. Johnson has been sent to Wientzka as cover for TSY to meet with WIRG. WIRG on the other hand, having fully exerted his strength vis-a-vis Washington in getting Col. Johnson assigned to Wientzka now leaves Col. Johnson sitting in Wientzka while he, at the scheduled time for the meeting, comes to Washington to raise questions, such as: did FUSA know of Col. Johnson's appointment before the WIRG knew? Obviously WIRG is following the advice still of V. P. GNA and is playing politics against the Agency. Questions: Is it now worthwhile trying to establish a public relations cover for Col. Johnson or should we simply have him represent himself as an intermediary of the U. S. Government? This "class" indicates clearly the lack of any real agreement in the White House and State Department; or for that matter in the Agency. So exactly how we wish to conduct relations with the CGC, even as a procedural matter, much less with regard to major substantive issues, any guidance on this would be extremely helpful.

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1400/WH/4/AM Wednesdays (6 October 1961)

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